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I. INTRODUCTION
In a futile quest to bring some coherence to its political gerrymandering
jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has insisted on either aping
the approach of its racial vote dilution jurisprudence or using race to regulate
politics. The fact that this quest has been remarkably unsuccessful has, thus
far, scarcely proven incapable of deterring the Court from its pursuit. As a
consequence of this ineffectual exercise, the Court finds itself in a bind: a
majority of the Court is deeply troubled by partisan excesses in legislative
line-drawing, but is without an approach for bridling such excesses.
Judging from the early returns in the form of League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 1 the Roberts Court appears similarly
ensnared and seems unlikely to develop anytime soon a resolution that will
untie this wickedly tangled knot. In LULAC, various plaintiffs alleged that
Texas’ 2003 congressional redistricting constituted an unconstitutional racial
and partisan gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Justice Kennedy wrote an
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, parts of which were joined by
six other Justices. In a part of the opinion in which no other Justice agreed to
join him, Justice Kennedy decided that the congressional redistricting plan at
issue was not an unconstitutional political gerrymander because the plaintiffs
did not present an administrable standard. 2 Though it is clear from LULAC
that political gerrymandering claims remain justiciable—an issue that was
somewhat ambiguous in Vieth 3 —it is also clear that the Court is no closer to
an agreement on an administrable standard. 4 Thus, LULAC offers nothing
new on the issue of administrability and was in that sense a disappointment. 5
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1 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) [hereinafter LULAC].
2 Id. at 2609–11.
3 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
4 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito agreed with Justice Kennedy’s conclusion
that the plaintiffs did not present an administrable standard. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2652
(Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). They
purported to offer no opinion on the issue of the justiciability of political gerrymanders.
Id. Justices Scalia and Thomas continue to adhere to their positions that political
gerrymandering claims are not justiciable. Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
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That the Court failed to deliver on the implied promise of developing an
administrable standard for adjudicating political gerrymander claims does not
mean that it has given up on the near-term possibility of limiting the
propensity of legislative actors to engage in extreme partisan line-drawing.
Indeed, as I shall argue in this Article, the Court’s decision in LULAC may be
precisely such an attempt.
One way to read LULAC is to regard Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that
the State violated Section 2 in redrawing the boundaries of District 23 as a
triumph for the concept of racial representation. In Part III of the opinion,
which was joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, Justice
Kennedy concluded that the State violated Section 2 of the VRA by
redrawing a majority-Latino district, District 23, and reducing the number of
Latino voters in that district. The Court also concluded that the State could
not cure the Section 2 violation by offsetting the loss of District 23 with the
creation of a different majority-Latino district, District 25, because District
25 was not required by Section 2—a necessary requirement, from the
majority’s perspective, for justifying an offset. There is a certain amount of
nuance or sophistication in Justice Kennedy’s vote dilution discussion.
Unlike the Shaw line of cases or the nose-holding, tiptoeing-through-themuck image conjured by the Chief Justice’s “sordid business . . . divvying us
up by race” 6 obiter in LULAC, Justice Kennedy’s opinion reflected a certain
level of comfort with the concept of racial representation. Justice Kennedy
seemed at ease commenting on the extent of racially-polarized voting in the
area around District 23. Though Justice Kennedy expressed some concern
with race essentialism, his observation that the State should not treat all
Latino voters alike simply because they are Latino is not deployed to
undermine the concept of racial representation—as in the Shaw cases—but to
buttress the Court’s argument that the State should not have diluted Latino
voting power in District 23. 7 Note for example the non-awkward references
to “Latino voting power,” “Latino political power,” and “Latino voters.”
dissenting). Justices Souter and Ginsburg would dismiss the gerrymandering question as
improvidently considered on the ground that the Court remains deeply fractured on the
issue. Id. at 2647. Justices Stevens and Breyer would find a constitutional violation. Id. at
2635.
5 Compare id. at 2607 (“We do not revisit the justiciability holding but do proceed to
examine whether appellants’ claims offer the Court a manageable, reliable measure of
fairness for determining whether a partisan gerrymander violates the Constitution.”), with
id. at 2612 (“We conclude that appellants have established no legally impermissible use
of political classifications. For this reason, they state no claim on which relief may be
granted for their statewide challenge.”).
6 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2663 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
7 See infra Part III.
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These are all references that rest uncomfortably with a strictly-construed
prohibition on racial essentialism. 8 Moreover, in declining to find that
African-American voters suffered vote dilution as a consequence of the
dismantling of District 24, Justice Kennedy arguably faulted black voters for
not having demonstrably distinctive political interests from white voters in
the district and for not providing a primary challenge to the white incumbent,
Martin Frost. Lastly, in LULAC plaintiffs of color (at least some of them)
finally prevailed in a vote dilution lawsuit at the Supreme Court, and all this
by the pen of Justice Kennedy. This was a far cry from the halcyon days of
Shaw v. Reno, Miller v. Johnson, and their progeny.
Yet, upon closer inspection of the facts of the case and the Court’s
reasoning, it would be inaccurate to say that LULAC is only or even
primarily a racial gerrymandering case. By most accounts, the overriding
purpose of the 2003 congressional redistricting plan was to maximize the
number of Republican congressional seats and to minimize the number of
Democratic congressional seats. 9 The plan targeted all ten white incumbent
Democrat congressmen for defeat and none of the Democratic
representatives of color. 10 The Republican strategy was to draw a neat line
between race and politics and to pursue as radical a partisan agenda as
possible. 11
This is not to say that voters of color were not adversely impacted by the
redistricting plan. Given the relationship between voters of color and the
Democratic Party, especially in Texas where most citizens of color vote for
the Democratic Party, a redistricting plan that adversely affects the
Democratic Party is sure to have a negative impact on voters of color as
Democrats. 12 As between a racial vote dilution claim and a partisan
gerrymandering claim, the partisan gerrymandering claim is best supported
by the facts of the case.
Moreover, it is hard to reconcile the fact that Justice Kennedy stretches
existing doctrine to find racial vote dilution in District 23, yet goes out of his
way not to find racial vote dilution in District 24. As the Chief Justice rightly
stated, “[w]hatever the majority believes it is fighting with its holding, it is

8 While we are at it, notice also the use of the appellation “Latino” as opposed to

“Hispanic.”
9 See, e.g., STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND: CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING
IN TEXAS AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY 214 (2007) (noting that the purpose of the
2003 redistricting was to “maximize Republican voting strength while minimizing
Democratic voting strength”).
10 Id. at 98.
11 Id. at 108 (“The final [redistricting] plan was as partisan as the Republicans
thought the law would allow.”).
12 Id. at 214.
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not vote dilution on the basis of race . . . .” 13 To find sufficient facts from
LULAC to support a racial vote dilution claim but not a partisan
gerrymandering claim is puzzling.
So what then are Justice Kennedy and the majority fighting with their
holding if not racial discrimination? In this Article I shall explain two ways
of reading LULAC: first as a case that vindicates the value of racial
representation, second as a case concerned about representation itself. Part II
describes why LULAC failed as a straightforward partisan gerrymandering
case. Part III explores LULAC as a race case. Part III also argues that if
LULAC is to be understood as a race case, it will be because Justice Kennedy
was defending a nuanced concept of anti-essentialism that focuses on the
authenticity of racial representation. Part IV argues that politics, not race, is
the majority’s concern in LULAC and that the case is the first application of
Justice Kennedy’s nascent “representation rights” concept first introduced in
Vieth. Part V considers the meaning of LULAC and examines whether
LULAC signals doom for the VRA, as at least one prominent commentator
has argued. I reject that argument and propose that LULAC is the Court’s
attempt to constrain excessive partisan gerrymandering by using race. I then
explore the benefits and limits of that strategy. Part V also argues that
LULAC has introduced a radically new equal protection right that could
potentially destabilize election law and the Court’s larger antidiscrimination
jurisprudence. I conclude with a cursory evaluation of the impact of LULAC
on voting rights doctrine.

II. A POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING CASE THAT WASN’T
The underlying facts of LULAC must have seemed so promising to the
Court when it first agreed to hear the case. In the shadow of the severely
fractured Vieth opinion, the Court expected to resolve a highly visible, middecade, extremely partisan, Tom Delay redistricting plan. With the
Democratic state legislators fleeing the state to prevent a legislative quorum,
there was high drama in Texas and the arcana of redistricting was finally
starring on the public stage. The Court was poised to say something
important on one of the least likely issues to capture the public’s imagination.
Unfortunately, the facts did not quite cooperate. The case was not as
straightforward as it first appeared. As a point of departure, the Republican
gerrymander was an unabashed attempt to undo the effects of previous proDemocratic gerrymanders. As Justice Stevens noted, Texas had long been a
one-party state. Since the Civil war, the “Democrats maintained their
political power by excluding black voters from participating in primary
13 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2663 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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elections, by the artful management of multimember electoral schemes, and,
most recently, by outrageously partisan gerrymandering.” 14 Though the 2003
Republican redistricting plan was clearly a pro-Republican gerrymander, it
was as clearly the Republicans’ attempt to undo past Democratic
gerrymanders. Indeed, from Justice Kennedy’s perspective, the swing Justice
on these issues, the Republican plan was an obvious improvement over the
previous Democratic gerrymanders. Writing only for himself, he described
the plan as “fairer” than the previous plans because the plan “can be seen as
making the party balance more congruent to statewide party power.” 15 Thus,
what at first blush appeared to be an easy case of overreaching by the
Republican Party, upon closer examination became less certain; neither party
could claim that it had acted with clean hands in the process.
Second, even the mid-decade re-redistricting aspect of the case, which
gave it a particularly sordid partisan flavor and was thought to provide the
Supreme Court a narrow basis for reversing the three-judge panel below, 16
seemed less objectionable upon closer look. The Republicans argued that this
was not a re-redistricting as the first redistricting was a court-drawn plan.
Justice Kennedy largely agreed. The Constitution, Justice Kennedy noted,
delegates redistricting to the elected branches: Congress and the state
legislatures. 17 Because redistricting is quintessentially a legislative function
and is most legitimate when performed by a legislature, 18 “if a legislature
acts to replace a court-drawn plan with one of its own design, no
presumption of impropriety should attach to the legislative decision . . . .” 19
Moreover, as Justice Kennedy intimated, it is not clear that there is
anything particularly tawdry with mid-decade re-redistricting per se—even
assuming that the previous redistricting was performed by the legislature. A
re-redistricting can improve upon a previous redistricting by more accurately
reflecting the preferences of the relevant electorate, especially where there
are significant mid-decade population shifts. Unless one is willing to adopt a
per se rule against mid-decade redistricting and forgo the potential of its
salutary effects, one has to examine “the content of the legislation
enacted.” 20
14 Id. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
15 Id. at 2610 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
16 See id. at 2632 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contrasting “the narrow question

presented” by LULAC with the question presented in Vieth).
17 Id. at 2607–08.
18 See id. at 2608–09 (noting that “to prefer a court-drawn plan to a legislature’s
replacement would be contrary to the ordinary and proper operation of the political
process”).
19 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2608.
20 Id. at 2610.
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Fundamentally, the Court in LULAC was left in the same place as it
found itself in Vieth—troubled by political gerrymandering but without a
standard for identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders. Having
concluded that the Republican gerrymander was fairer than the previous
court-drawn plan and the previous Democratic gerrymanders, and having
concluded that the mid-decade character of the case was a red herring, the
matter appeared to be at an end.

III. LULAC AS VINDICATING RACIAL REPRESENTATION
The Court then turned its attention to deciding whether the State violated
the rights of voters of color in enacting the redistricting plan. Justice
Kennedy, this time joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg,
concluded that Texas violated Section 2 of the VRA when the State removed
approximately 100,000 mainly Latino—and almost by description
Democratic—voters from District 23 in order to protect Republican
incumbent Representative Henry Bonilla.
With one stroke of the pen, Justice Kennedy (with the helpful
acquiescence of four other Justices) transformed a dispute over partisan
gerrymandering into an improbable and conflicted one about race. Given that
LULAC came two terms after Vieth, it was not surprising that the Court did
not have much new to say on the standards for resolving partisan
gerrymandering claims. Though we learned from LULAC that a majority of
the Court believes that partisan gerrymandering claims remain justiciable, we
did not even learn whether the Chief Justice and Justice Alito are part of that
majority. What is surprising about LULAC is the critical role that race played
in the case. And, as I shall argue later, what is interesting and unique about
LULAC is the manner in which race was deployed to limit politics.
This Part explores a characterization of LULAC as a guarded vindication
for the concept of racial representation. The argument here is that to the
extent LULAC is a race case, the concern is with the authenticity of racial
representation. To appreciate this point one must first come to grips with the
manner in which Justice Kennedy attempted to overcome two substantial
hurdles in order to conclude that the State violated the VRA in altering the
population of District 23.
The first hurdle is the trial court’s unequivocal factual determinations.
The trial court found as a matter of fact that the State was motivated by two
related reasons for modifying District 23. The trial court stated, “The record
presents undisputed evidence that the Legislature desired to increase the
number of Republican votes cast in Congressional District 23 to shore up
Bonilla’s base and assist in his reelection.” 21 The trial court subsequently
21 Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 488 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
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noted, “It is undisputed that Plan 1374C eliminated Congressional District 23
as a district with a Latino majority citizen voting age population for the
political purpose of increasing Republican voters in the district and shoring
up the reelection chances of the Republican incumbent.” 22 The trial court
also concluded that “[t]here is little question but that the single-minded
purpose of the Texas Legislature in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan
advantage.” 23 Thus, from the trial court’s unambiguous and insistently
emphatic determinations, the only reasons for the alteration of District 23
were for the sometimes complementary purposes of partisan and incumbency
protection. The trial court’s opinion virtually screams: this case is about
politics, it has nothing to do with race. 24
The second hurdle is the creation of District 25. As a factual matter,
District 25 is relevant because its existence buttressed further the trial court’s
finding that the State did not intend to violate the Section 2 rights of Latino
voters and did not do so in effect. It is hard to argue that there was intent to
discriminate or discriminatory effect when the Legislature, in order to offset
the loss of District 23, created a substitute majority-Latino district, which, as
the Chief Justice argued, was more effective than District 23 as a Latino
opportunity district. Notwithstanding the strength of this point, the hurdle
here is not factual but doctrinal.
As a doctrinal matter, states have been given wide latitude in determining
where to draw Section 2 districts. This latitude is thought to be necessary
because there are often many goals that the state is trying to maximize in the
redistricting process. These goals include satisfying the one person one vote
principle, respecting relevant geographical boundaries, satisfying the VRA,
and maximizing political opportunities. Consequently, as the Court
maintained in Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), even where a plaintiff has conclusively
demonstrated that her vote has been diluted under Section 2, “[t]his does not
mean that a § 2 plaintiff has the right to be placed in a majority-minority
district once a violation of the statute is shown. States retain broad discretion
in drawing districts to comply with the mandate of § 2.” 25
When one combines the trial court’s findings of fact and Shaw II’s
doctrinal point, LULAC was an unlikely race case. In order to reject the trial
court’s findings of fact, the Court had to conclude that the trial court’s
findings of fact were clearly erroneous. That is, Justice Kennedy had to
determine not only that there were facts in the record that proved racial intent
or effect, but that the facts were so overwhelming that the trial court’s
findings went against the great weight of the evidence. Given the record, this
22 Id. at 496.
23 Id. at 470.
24 See id. at 472 (noting again that “politics, not race, drove Plan 1374C”).
25 Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 917 n.9 (1996).

1192

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:1185

was a formidable hurdle. Despite this hurdle, Justice Kennedy did not simply
conclude that the trial court was wrong on the Section 2 point, but he went as
far as to note that the State’s action might even support a finding of
intentional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. 26
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that a state has wide discretion of where
to draw a Section 2 district. However, he maintained, the state’s discretion
“has limits.” 27 He went on to note that a proposed Section 2 offset district is
only consistent with Section 2 where the “racial group[s] in each area had a
§ 2 right and both could not be accommodated.” 28 A racial group does not
have a Section 2 right if the group’s population is non-compact or
dispersed. 29 Justice Kennedy concluded, “since there is no § 2 right to a
district that is not reasonably compact, the creation of a noncompact district
does not compensate for the dismantling of a compact opportunity district.” 30
Therefore, Justice Kennedy reasoned, the creation of District 25 did not
suffice as a substitute district because District 25 was not sufficiently
compact. 31
To the extent that LULAC says something about racial representation, 32
the case is a surprising absolution for the concept of racial representation.
Admittedly, it is tempting to read LULAC as an anti-racial essentialism case.
It is true that Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems to pay homage to the principle
of anti-racial essentialism. Specifically, in his discussion of District 25,
Justice Kennedy explains that the fundamental problem with District 25 is its
combination of “two far-flung segments of a racial group with disparate
interests.” 33 Quoting the Court’s earlier decisions in Shaw I and Miller v.
Johnson, Justice Kennedy further noted that when “the only common index
is race,” 34 the State is operating upon the impermissible assumption that
racial identity dictates political identity. 35 “[B]y failing to account for the
differences between people of the same race,” Justice Kennedy warned, we
26 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2622 (2006) (noting that the alteration of District 23

“bears the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal protection
violation”).
27 Id. at 2616 (“The Court has rejected the premise that a State can always make up
for less-than-equal opportunity of some individuals by providing greater opportunity to
others.”).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 2617.
30 Id. (citation omitted).
31 Id. at 2616–17.
32 I shall argue shortly that LULAC uses race instrumentally to curb politics.
33 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2618.
34 Id. at 2619.
35 Id. at 2618 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)).
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do “a disservice” to the twin goals of eliminating racial discrimination and
creating a society where race is no longer relevant. 36
At a very superficial level, Justice Kennedy’s worry about race
essentialism harkens back to the strong anti-essentialism strain identified
with the quintessential anti-essentialism case, Shaw I, and its progeny.
Indeed, as I note above, Justice Kennedy explicitly relied upon Shaw I and
Miller. However, Justice Kennedy’s relatively weak gesture in the direction
of anti-essentialism is deployed for a very different reason than the antiessentialism argument of the Court in the Shaw line of cases.
In the Shaw line of cases, the anti-essentialism argument was deployed to
remonstrate against race-consciousness in the line-drawing process. The
central question that was presented in the Shaw cases was the extent to which
the State could depart from the ideal of colorblindness in order to provide
representation from voters of color. The Court was deciding between a
modicum of race-blindness and race-consciousness. The clear import of the
Court’s holding in Shaw and its progeny was that the State should always
strive to be raceblind; racial districting, “even for remedial purposes” can be
essentialist. 37 Thus, the State is justified in using race in the redistricting
process where it uses race sparingly and where it has a compelling
justification for doing so.
By contrast, in LULAC, Justice Kennedy is not deciding between raceconsciousness and race-blindness; rather, the choice is between token racial
representation and authentic racial representation. For the purpose of this
analysis, an authentic representative is one that is substantially the choice of
the relevant electorate with minimal interference by the State. A token
representative is one that is primarily assigned by the State with minimal
input by the relevant electorate. Authentic representation attempts to
maximize the autonomy and agency of voters. 38 Justice Kennedy’s antiessentialism argument is not an argument against race-consciousness and
racial representation. It is about the need to protect the autonomy of these
Latino voters to choose their representative against interference by the State,
which would prefer a different choice.
Justice Kennedy’s primary task is to explain why the dismantling of a
“Latino opportunity district” is inconsistent with Section 2 of the VRA.
Unlike the Court’s task in the Shaw line of cases, Justice Kennedy’s purpose
in LULAC relies upon the necessary assumption, which Justice Kennedy
engages in repeatedly throughout the opinion, that one can coherently refer to
Latinos in District 23 not just as a racial group but as a racial group that

36 Id. at 2618.
37 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
38 I describe this distinction in more detail infra Part III.
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shares a distinctive political identity. 39 Put differently, the framework of the
Section 2 inquiry not only assumes but requires explicitly a political
cohesiveness for which race is “the only common index.” 40 The whole
enterprise is otherwise incoherent. Unlike the Shaw line of cases, which
seemed to question the constitutional viability of that assumption, Justice
Kennedy explicitly deploys that assumption to address what he understands
as the problem with the revised District 23.
From Justice Kennedy’s opinion, there are at least two problems with the
modification of District 23. First, by modifying the lines of District 23, the
State impeded Latinos in District 23 from choosing a representative of their
choice. As Justice Kennedy explains, at the very moment that Latinos were
about to choose their own representative and dispose of the representative
that was unresponsive to their interests, “[t]he State . . . made fruitless the
Latinos’ mobilization efforts.” 41
This assumption—that there is a critical link between racial and political
identity—is fundamentally inconsistent with the strong anti-essentialism bent
of the Shaw cases. Recall that in Shaw, there was no reason to believe that
the district in question, North Carolina’s congressional District 12,
aggregated voters on the basis of race without regard to either political
identity. In fact, the Court seemed reluctant to explore any possible linkages
between racial and political identity. To explore such a linkage would itself
give credence to an assumption that the Court viewed as essentialist and
therefore constitutionally suspect. Not so with LULAC.
Justice Kennedy’s second problem is the fact that the State used race
cynically to create the impression of authentic representation. According to
Justice Kennedy’s analysis, Latino voters were entitled to one additional
representative in south and west Texas. Moreover, Latino voters in District
23 were about to select a representative of their own choosing. Instead of
respecting that choice, Texas assigned Latino voters a “Latino”
representative.
Consider three possible fictional candidates for the title of authentic
Latino representative. Candidate number one is a Latino Republican
candidate from District 23; we will call him Henry Bonilla. Candidate
number two is the representative from District 25. He is an Anglo Democrat
from central Texas; we will call him Lloyd Doggett. Candidate number three
is the Latino representative that Latino voters from District 23 would have
chosen in the absence of interference by the State—i.e., if the State had not
39 See, e.g., LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2619 (“The Latinos in District 23 had found an

efficacious political identity.”); see also Ellen Katz, Reviving the Right to Vote, 68 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1163, 1174 (2007).
40 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2619.
41 Id. at 2622.
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moved 100,000 Latino voters out of District 23. We will call this would be
representative Ciro Rodriguez. Among those three, which candidate has the
weakest claim to authenticity, and which has the strongest claim to
authenticity?
Quite clearly Henry Bonilla is the least authentic Latino representative.
Henry Bonilla has two facts that cut in his favor. First, he is Latino.
Superficially, one can describe him as a Latino Republican elected in a
district with a majority of Latino voters. But this fact is irrelevant as it is
simply an unvarnished version of the old debate between descriptive and
substantive representation. No serious thinker today believes in such a
narrow conception of descriptive representation. Thus, the fact that Bonilla is
Latino is of no moment. This is a fairly prosaic point.
Moreover, the fact that he was elected in a district where the majority of
the individuals of voting age were Latinos is less significant than it might
otherwise be. The redistricting plan reduced the number of Latinos in District
23 just enough to assure the election of a Latino Republican incumbent and
maintain sufficient number of Latinos in the district so that the voting age
population of the district—though not the citizenship population—was
majority Latino. Justice Kennedy found this devious practice particularly
irksome. As he stated, the manner in which the state redrew District 23
“becomes even more suspect when considered in light of evidence
suggesting that the State intentionally drew District 23 to have a nominal
Latino voting-age majority (without a citizen voting-age majority) for
political reasons.” 42
What matters is that Bonilla is demonstrably ideologically opposed to the
ideological preferences of Latino voters in the region and that they have
repeatedly repudiated him in very clear terms. So, we can confidently and
easily conclude that Bonilla is not an authentic representative of the Latino
community in District 23. With similar confidence, we can maintain that Ciro
Rodriguez is an authentic Latino representative because he is the candidate
that Latino voters would have chosen for themselves in the absence of strong
interference by the State. Thus, as between these two representatives, the
choice is clear.
The complication of course is District 25. The issue that plagued Justice
Kennedy in LULAC is whether one should consider District 25’s
representative authentic or not. The complication here is two-fold because
the question cannot be answered totally in the abstract. It is not sufficient to
ask whether Lloyd Doggett, the wealthy white representative from central
Texas, is an authentic representative; one must also ask whether he is an
adequate substitute for the Mexican-born Ciro Rodriguez.

42 Id. 126 S. Ct. at 2623.
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When the State altered District 23 to protect Bonilla and created District
25, it thereby made a choice in favor of Doggett at the expense of Rodriguez.
More importantly, it did so with a marked cynical insouciance for the varied
Latino communities which were impacted by its redistricting plan. It had no
respect for the different Latino communities in the area. 43 The State broke
apart one community and tied together two other communities not because
the State decided that this was the best way to represent the Latino
communities in the area, but because the State wanted to promote its political
agenda while paying lip service to the idea of Latino representation. 44 It is
this move by the State that troubled Justice Kennedy.
To the extent that LULAC is a race case, Justice Kennedy’s opinion is a
nuanced—and dare I say progressive—defense of the relationship between
racial identity and political identity. The essentialism that Justice Kennedy
finds troubling is this cynical use of race for strictly partisan purposes at the
expense of authentic racial representation. It is the fundamental assumption
of the swap of District 25 for District 23—that one Latino community and
therefore one Latino representative is just as good as another—that prompts
the concern with racial essentialism. Justice Kennedy’s complaint is not that
the State has privileged a race-conscious process at the expense of a raceblind one, but that the State has privileged, without sufficient justification, an
inauthentic conception of racial representation at the expense of an authentic
conception without sufficient justification. Viewed in these terms, Justice
Kennedy is articulating a rather sophisticated defense of racial
representation. The objection to this type of essentialism—that the State is
indifferent to the racial authenticity of representation—is quite different from
the objection that animated the Shaw cases—that the very idea of racial
representation is itself essentialist.

IV. LULAC AS VINDICATING REPRESENTATIONAL RIGHTS
But this is not the only way to understand LULAC. The racial
representation reading of LULAC is based upon the premise that race was at
43 See id. at 2618.
44 Justice Kennedy stated:

The State chose to break apart a Latino opportunity district to protect the incumbent
congressman from the growing dissatisfaction of the cohesive and politically active
Latino community in the district. The State then purported to compensate for this
harm by creating an entirely new district that combined two groups of Latinos,
hundreds of miles apart, that represent different communities of interest. Under § 2,
the State must be held accountable for the effect of these choices in denying equal
opportunity to Latino voters.

Id. at 2623.
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the center of the Court’s concern. It implies that LULAC is primarily about
race and the meaning of the VRA. But consider a different reading of LULAC
where politics returns to the center of Justice Kennedy’s concern.
In this Part, I shall argue for an alternative and perhaps more persuasive
reading of LULAC where the concern is not with race itself but the fact that
the State supplanted the very purpose of elections by assigning representation
and did so precisely to undermine the accountability function of elections.
This way of understanding LULAC gets us closer to Justice Kennedy’s
concern about “representational rights” in the political gerrymandering
context.
The key to understanding LULAC and its meaning is to resolve why
Justice Kennedy preferred District 23 to Districts 24 and 25. The critical
datum in the construction of District 23 is the fact that the District was
constructed to protect Henry Bonilla. This was an incumbent protection
gerrymander with side benefits for the Republican Party. The State of Texas
removed from Bonilla’s district the voters who were most dissatisfied with
his representation and were most likely to vote against him.
Notwithstanding all of the noises that the Court makes about race, Justice
Kennedy acknowledged this key fact. He remarked, “the reason for taking
Latinos out of District 23, according to the District Court, was to protect
Congressman Bonilla from a constituency that was increasingly voting
against him.” 45 The fact that those votes were voters of color was fortuitous.
It served to underscore the problem; it provided the Court a statutory and
doctrinal hook for articulating its concerns; and it shielded the Court from
accusations that it was further enmeshing itself into the political thicket.
Though once again we are blinded by race, one should not get away from the
underlying political facts of the case: District 23 was altered for political as
opposed to racial reasons.
One must also acknowledge how the Court comes to grips with the
politics of the case. The problem with District 23 is that Texas decided that
Bonilla was going to be the representative of District 23 irrespective of the
preferences of the voters. This assignment of representation is inconsistent
with the central mechanism of democracy for attaining representation, which
is an election. 46 As Justice Kennedy noted, Latino voters were mobilizing
and were on the cusp of realizing a fuller extent of their political power at the
ballot box. 47 As he remarked, it is precisely because Latino voters were about
to exercise their political power and were about to do so in a manner that was
inconsistent with the preferences of the State, that the State removed them
45 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622.
46 The theoretical ideas that underlie this part are fully fleshed out in Guy-Uriel E.

Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601 (2007).
47 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622.
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from the district. 48 The question for the Court’s gerrymandering
jurisprudence is whether there are limitations on a State’s ability to alter
electoral structures when voter preferences are inimical to the state’s
preferences. 49 What is the purpose of elections if the State will repeatedly
seek to impose its preferences on the electoral process?
Relatedly, as the Court recognized, the assignment of representation
undermines the accountability function of elections. Justice Kennedy noted:
[Though] incumbency protection can be a legitimate factor in districting . . .
experience teaches that incumbency protection can take various forms, not
all of them in the interests of the constituents. If the justification for
incumbency protection is to keep the constituency intact so the officeholder
is accountable for promises made or broken, then the protection seems to
accord with concern for the voters. If, on the other hand, incumbency
protection means excluding some voters from the district simply because
they are likely to vote against the officeholder, the change is to benefit the
officeholder, not the voters. By purposely redrawing lines around those who
opposed Bonilla, the state legislature took the latter course. 50

Thus, Justice Kennedy’s primary concern with District 23 is the
assignment of representation by the State.
One cannot gainsay the fact that the accountability function of elections
is rendered ineffective if redistricters prior to the election can remove from
the district the individuals most likely to vote against the representative. As
the quote above demonstrates, this observation did not escape the Court’s
attention.
It is this accountability function that makes for effective representation.
Though a representative can be motivated to be responsive to her constituents
by a sense of obligation or by the fortuitous congruence of preferences, we
rely upon elections as the primary mechanism to ensure responsiveness and
effective motivation. If we are to maximize the possibility for effective
representation, there must be a robust mechanism by which a representative
is held accountable by her constituents.
This account also best explains why Justice Kennedy was unsympathetic
to the plaintiffs in District 24. African-American voters in District 24 argued
that changes to the district diluted their votes in violation of Section 2.
Though African Americans did not constitute a majority of voters in the
district—they constituted 26% of the citizen-age voting population—they
argued that they effectively controlled the district because they constituted
48 Id.
49 Or perhaps more precisely, the question is whether there are non-race-based

limitations on such state action.
50 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622–23 (citation omitted).
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the majority of voters in the Democratic primary of a Democratic district.
Using the district court’s finding that African-American voters could not
elect their candidate of choice in the primary, Justice Kennedy rejected the
Section 2 claim. Justice Kennedy argued:
[Absent] any contested Democratic primary in District 24 over the last 20
years, no obvious benchmark exists for deciding whether AfricanAmericans could elect their candidate of choice. The fact that AfricanAmericans voted for Frost—in the primary and general elections—could
signify he is their candidate of choice. Without a contested primary,
however, it could also be interpreted to show (assuming racial bloc voting)
that Anglos and Latinos would vote in the Democratic primary in greater
numbers if an African-American candidate of choice were to run, especially
given Texas’ open primary system. 51

The challenge for the plaintiffs challenging the dismantling of District 24
is that they are asking the Court to restore an incumbent-protection
gerrymander without sufficient justification. As Justice Kennedy remarked,
this district was created by Democrat Martin Frost for Martin Frost when the
Democrats last controlled the redistricting process. To restore Martin Frost to
this district would be to undermine the principle against state assignment of
representation, a principle that Justice Kennedy defended in safeguarding the
representational rights of voters of District 23. It would also be to reward the
partisan gerrymandering of the Democrats against the partisan
gerrymandering of the Republicans, which Justice Kennedy refused to do
when addressing the partisan gerrymandering claim. 52
Moreover, as Justice Kennedy pointed out, when the State assigns
representation, it is difficult to determine who is an authentic representative.
Authentic representation is determined by a process in which the electoral
outcome is contestable. 53 The problem here is that there were not genuine
opportunities for true contestation. As did the district court, Justice Kennedy
seems to credit the trial court testimony that the district was not contestable

51 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2624.
52 Id. at 2610.
53 Note that my argument is not that the election has to be contested, but that it has

to be contestable. Or more precisely, if the election is not contested, it is not because of
artificial interference by the state. When the state assigns representation, the state limits,
if not eliminates, opportunities for genuine contestation. So the problem is not
contestation or competition, the problem is the artificial interference by the State to
eliminate contestation or competition where it might otherwise exist. Thus, the evil to be
avoided is not a lack of competition or contestation, but undue interference by the State.
This is why I part company with Professor Katz’s thoughtful and provocative
contribution to this symposium. See Katz, supra note 39.
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because African-Americans could not elect their preferred candidates. 54
Thus, when the plaintiffs in District 24 come to the Court to complain that
their representative was unfairly taken away, Justice Kennedy justly
expressed skepticism: how are we to know that he was truly your
representative without elections that are not capable of being contested? 55
The truth is we do not. State assignment of representation undermines the
accountability function of elections and makes it difficult to determine
authentic representation.
Perhaps more importantly, this articulation of the harm provides some
insight into Justice Kennedy’s inchoate representational rights concept, first
explored in Vieth. 56 Justice Kennedy opened his opinion in Vieth by noting
that “A decision ordering the correction of all election district lines drawn for
partisan reasons would commit federal and state courts to unprecedented
intervention in the American political process.” 57 He then went on, as many
commentators have remarked, to note that “while understanding that great
caution is necessary when approaching” the issue of gerrymandering, he
“would not foreclose all possibility of relief if some limited and precise
rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in
some redistricting cases.” 58 He then cautioned that this principle “must rest
on something more than the conclusion that political classifications were
applied. It must rest instead on a conclusion that the classifications, though
generally permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way
unrelated to any legitimate objective.” 59
The oddity of Justice Kennedy’s opinion is the introduction of this new
concept of representational rights. Justice Kennedy referenced the concept
throughout the opinion as if we all ought to know what representational
rights are, 60 yet he never defined it. So we are all left to guess. However,
from his opinion in Vieth one can cull some basic parameters. First, the
ostensible purpose of the “limited and precise rationale,” the constitutional
principle, would be to protect representational rights. Second,
representational rights belong to both voters and parties. 61 Third,
representational rights are not really rights in the traditional sense of the term
54 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2625.
55 Or perhaps, more precisely, elections that were designed to be uncontestable.
56 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
57 Id. 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 307.
60 See id. (“At first it might seem that courts could determine, by the exercise of

their own judgment, whether political classifications are related to this object or instead
burden representational rights.”).
61 Id. at 313.
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but more structural devices for limiting official overreaching in the design of
electoral structures. 62 Fourth and more substantively, representational rights
are implicated when the government targets and burdens a group of voters
simply because of the voters’ political identity. 63
LULAC is useful because it confirms this substantive principle and starts
to map out its contours. Recall that Justice Kennedy’s task was to find a
limited and precise rationale that would distinguish between permissible
political classifications and impermissible political classifications. As Justice
Kennedy stated in Vieth in discussing the relevance of the First Amendment
in the political gerrymandering context, “the inquiry is not whether political
classifications were used. The inquiry instead is whether political
classifications were used to burden a group’s representational rights.” 64 In
contrasting the advantages of a First Amendment analysis to an Equal
Protection Clause analysis, he maintained:
The equal protection analysis puts its emphasis on the permissibility of an
enactment’s classifications. This works where race is involved since
classifying by race is almost never permissible. It presents a more
complicated question when the inquiry is whether a generally permissible
classification has been used for an impermissible purpose. That question
can only be answered in the affirmative by the subsidiary showing that the
classification as applied imposes unlawful burdens. 65

LULAC adds an additional element into the inquiry: the justification for
the classification. The inquiry is not only whether a permissible political
classification was used that burdened a group of voters; the inquiry also
includes whether the State had an impermissible reason for imposing this
burden. In constitutional law there are types of State justifications that cannot
justify certain types of burdens upon groups or individuals; these
impermissible justifications are sometimes referred to as exclusionary
reasons. 66
Justice Kennedy’s incumbency protection analysis in LULAC is a perfect
application of the constitutional law theory of exclusionary reasons.
Incumbency protection is a permissible political classification. It implicates
“representational rights” when it burdens a group of voters. It violates their
representational rights when the State is motivated by an impermissible
62 See Charles, supra note 46.
63 Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099,

1135–36 (2005).
64 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
65 Id.
66 See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 712 (1994).
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justification. In adjudicating a representational right, the permissibility of the
State justification is paramount.
Though the Court needs to continue to map out the margins of this new
concept, we can see that it has content. It does real work in LULAC. The core
substantive component is that, where the State’s design of electoral structures
imposes burdens upon a group of voters, the State implicates the voters’
representational rights. Now it is true that all districting imposes a burden
upon a certain group of voters. Whether redistricting violates a group of
voters’ representational rights depends upon the permissibility of the State
justification. The State is not justified when it burdens representational rights
because those rights were about to be exercised (or were in fact exercised) in
a manner that was inconsistent with the State’s preferences. Such a
justification is an exclusionary reason.
The assignment of representation in Districts 23 and 25 violated the
representational rights of Latino voters who were poised to choose their
representatives. The State burdened their representational rights by assigning
them a representative based upon an impermissible purpose and deprived
them of their ability to reap the reward of their political mobilization. The
Court simply objected to this unjustifiable assignment of representation.
This, I think, is the best explanation for the outcome in LULAC.
What emerges from LULAC is the possibility that the Court will examine
carefully incumbent protection gerrymanders—even those that do not have
any racial implications. There does not seem to be a principle that would
protect voters from incumbent protection gerrymanders when they are voters
of color but would not protect them when they are white. Part of the question
is how seriously the Court is willing to take this new representational right.

V. NAVEL GAZING: ON THE MEANING OF LULAC
To return to the theme of this Symposium, it is hard to predict what
LULAC portends for the Roberts Court’s voting rights jurisprudence. From
this temporal vantage point, LULAC appears to be hugely significant. For the
first time in the modern voting rights era a majority on the Supreme Court
found a violation of Section 2 of the VRA and concluded that a State was
required to draw a majority-minority district. The opinion might reinvigorate
the moribund concept of racial representation, which seemed out of favor in
the wake of the Shaw cases. However, no less of an authority than Richard
Pildes, one of the most perceptive students of the Court, is predicting doom
for those concerned about the future of the VRA. In this Part, I explore the
meaning of LULAC and its potential impact on the VRA. Part V.A explores
the argument that LULAC signals the end for the VRA and concludes
differently. Part V.B argues that LULAC is best understood as a case in which
the Court is using race to limit the excesses of partisan line-drawing.
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A. Why LULAC Does Not Spell the End for the VRA
In his thoughtful and provocative contribution to this Symposium
Professor Pildes remarks that “[f]ar from a ringing endorsement of the law of
minority vote dilution, LULAC reveals a Court increasingly troubled by—
indeed, more and more resistant to—the very concept of minority vote
dilution and the accompanying legal requirement of ‘safe minority
districting.’” 67 Professor Pildes reads LULAC as a strongly anti-essentialist
opinion. Professor Pildes may turn out to be right about how LULAC is
ultimately interpreted in future voting rights cases. However, the evidence of
that projection is not contained in the only critical datum that we have
currently on this score: LULAC itself. The fact that the Court found a Section
2 violation is singularly significant in light of the Court’s previous voting
rights cases that have taken a crabbed view of the voting rights of people of
color. 68 For the past decade and a half, the Court has sowed the seeds for the
eventual holding that majority-minority districts, even where justified under
the VRA, are inconsistent with the Constitution. Yet in LULAC we find
Justice Kennedy no less speaking for at least four other members of the
Court, eloquently advocating in favor of a majority-minority district. In light
of the previous trend line—Shaw I, Miller v. Johnson, Bush v. Vera, Shaw II,
Georgia v. Ashcroft, etc.—the fact that there is a strong majority on the Court
that believes that the concept of racial representation is not ipso facto
unconstitutional is critical to the immediate future of the VRA and is deeply
inconsistent with the view that LULAC is unqualifiedly antagonistic to the
concept of racial representation.
When one examines LULAC carefully, it is apparent that the Court was
presented with numerous opportunities to interpret the Act narrowly. Not
only did the Court pass upon those opportunities to narrow the Act, in many
cases, the Court actually broadened the scope of the Act. I will examine three
such instances: (a) the Court’s analysis of the compactness requirement; (b)
the Court’s reliance upon the theretofore constitutionally-suspect results test;
and (c) the Court’s embryonic articulation of a more robust concept of
discrimination in the political process. As I will show in this subpart, if a
majority of the Court intended on sending a message about the decline of
legally mandated racial districting, the message is not very clear.

67 Richard H. Pidles, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1140 (2007).
68 See generally Terry Smith, Autonomy Versus Equality: Voting Rights
Rediscovered, 57 ALA. L. REV. 261 (2005).
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1. Redefinition of the Compactness Requirement
In previous cases, the Court had stated that where voters of color are
dispersed, the State does not have an obligation under Section 2 to draw
majority-minority districts. Specifically, in Bush v. Vera, the Court penned,
“[i]f, because of the dispersion of the minority population, a reasonably
compact majority-minority district cannot be created, § 2 does not require a
majority-minority district . . . .” 69 LULAC presented an opportune moment to
apply, if not narrow, the compactness requirement. Instead, the Court
noticeably eroded this compactness requirement and may have laid the
groundwork for its potential evisceration as a practical constraint under
Section 2. 70
In LULAC, Justice Kennedy found fault with District 25 because the
district was not sufficiently compact to serve as a Section 2 off-set district.
Justice Kennedy’s compactness analysis prompted a sharp response from
Chief Justice Roberts that compactness is not a requirement when the State
draws a majority-minority district; it is only an element of a plaintiff’s
Section 2 claim. Chief Justice Roberts is correct that, prior to LULAC,
compactness was not recognized as an element of the State’s defense of a
Section 2 district. Thus, he is right that Justice Kennedy introduced a
heretofore new constraint on the State’s discretion when the State seeks to
draw a Section 2 district.
On the face of it, it seems that Justice Kennedy narrowed the reach of
Section 2 by imposing a compactness requirement that did not exist prior to
LULAC. That is one way to read Justice Kennedy’s compactness analysis, but
I think that would be the wrong reading. Justice Kennedy’s point is that there
must be symmetry between the plaintiff’s claim and the State’s defense when
the plaintiff is bringing a Section 2 claim and the State is defending a Section
2 district. As I will argue here, this compactness requirement is not very
significant, and, because of the symmetry requirement, it lowers the
compactness standard for Section 2 plaintiffs.
What is compactness? Compactness is not necessarily geography, though
geography is relevant. “While no precise rule has emerged governing § 2
compactness,” the majority maintained in LULAC, the “inquiry should take
into account ‘traditional districting principles such as maintaining
communities of interest and traditional boundaries.’” 71 Compactness does
not disregard “[l]egitimate yet differing communities of interest . . . in the
69 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 979 (1996).
70 Dan Ortiz concludes similarly. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105

MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 48, 50–51 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/
firstimpressions/vol105/Ortiz.pdf.
71 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2006) (citation omitted).

2007]

RACE, REDISTRICTING, REPRESENTATION

1205

interest of race.” 72 However, race is not irrelevant. As the majority noted, “in
some cases members of a racial group in different areas—for example, rural
and urban communities—could share similar interests and therefore form a
compact district if the areas are reasonably close in proximity.” 73
Nevertheless, the Court stated that neither geography nor interest alone is
sufficient to make a district non-compact. 74 A district is non-compact only
when it combines racial communities separated by both “enormous
geographical distance . . . [and] disparate needs and interests . . . .” 75
The problem for Justice Kennedy is that he is committed to preserving
District 23 as a Section 2 district but not District 25, and he is equally
committed to a symmetry criterion of compactness. Under his symmetry
condition for compactness, whatever standard he sets for the State when it is
defending a Section 2 district is the same standard that will apply to plaintiffs
when they are alleging vote dilution under Section 2. This means whatever
standard of compactness Justice Kennedy applies to District 25 is the same
standard of compactness that he will have to apply to District 23. To
complicate matters for Justice Kennedy, as the Chief Justice explained, there
are very few differences between Districts 23 and 25. 76 Moreover, as Justice
Scalia noted, the new District 23 is more compact than the old District 23, 77
which Justice Kennedy is trying to revive. Both districts are race-conscious,
and the Latino populations in both districts are similarly dispersed.
Consider this issue from the vantage point of a Court hostile to Section 2
of the VRA. Such a Court easily could have used Vera (among other cases) to
conclude that, because of population dispersion, Latino voters in District 23
were not entitled to protection under Section 2. This would have been a
perfectly reasonable application of the current caselaw. Indeed, if the Court
were applying the current caselaw, this should have been the definition of
compactness: a non-compact district is one in which voters of color are
72 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2619.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Chief Justice Roberts argued:

The majority’s squeamishness about the supposed challenge facing a Latinopreferred candidate in District 25—having to appeal to Latino voters near the Rio
Grande and those near Austin—is not unlike challenges candidates face around the
country all the time, as part of a healthy political process. It is in particular not
unlike the challenge faced by a Latino-preferred candidate in the district favored by
the majority, former District 23, who must appeal to Latino voters both in San
Antonio and El Paso, 540 miles away.

Id. at 2661 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77 Id. at 2666 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
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geographically dispersed. The Court could have then reasoned that District
23 was not protected under Section 2. If District 23 was not protected under
Section 2, then District 25 was not required by the VRA as an offset district.
Consequently, there would have been no compelling state interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment. This would have been a straightforward analysis of
the Court’s Shaw jurisprudence. Thus, a Court hostile to the VRA could have
struck down both districts in one fell swoop by a casual application of
standard doctrine. Say what you will, it is remarkable that this Court did not
take this path to resolving LULAC. In any event, the strong essentialism
interpretation of LULAC is hard to square with the facts of the case.

2. Reliance Upon the Results Test
The Court had yet another opportunity to narrow the application of the
Act by raising further doubts about the constitutionality of the results test of
Section 2, the central provision of that section. Justice Kennedy’s conclusion
that Texas diluted the votes of Latino voters in District 23 depended
completely upon the results test. Though the Court intimated strongly that the
plaintiffs could make out a claim of discriminatory intent, 78 a point to which
I shall shortly return, the Court was ultimately convinced that
notwithstanding the State’s reason for redrawing District 23, the State
“cannot justify the effect on Latino voters.” 79
Relying upon the results test to invalidate the redistricting plan is
remarkable in view of the fact that the effects prong had long been
constitutionally suspect and has up to now been viewed as one of the most
vulnerable parts of the Act. Prior to LULAC, the Court had repeatedly called
into question the constitutionality of Section 2’s results test by “assum[ing]
without deciding that compliance with the results test . . . can be a
compelling state interest.” 80 A Court as troubled by racial vote dilution as
Professor Pildes portrays the Court in LULAC would have taken the ready
opportunity to emphatically add another stake through the heart of the Act.
Instead, the Court chose to extend the life of the Act by reducing doubts
about its most critical provision.

78 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622.
79 Id. at 2623; see also id. at 2615 (noting that “the concomitant rise in Latino voting

power in each successive election, the near-victory of the Latino candidate of choice in
2002, and the resulting threat to the Bonilla incumbency, were the very reasons that led
the State to redraw the district lines”).
80 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Stephen E.
Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rehnquist Court, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 350 (2002) (stating
that the Court is close to finding the results test unconstitutional).
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3. Redefining the Meaning of Discrimination
Perhaps the most radical possibility in the opinion centers around the
intriguing comments by Justice Kennedy that the redesign of District 23,
which “took away the Latinos’ opportunity because Latinos were about to
exercise it . . . bears the mark of intentional discrimination that could give
rise to an equal protection violation.”81 This comment is intriguing because it
is not clear what it means. As some commentators have noted, if all Justice
Kennedy means to say is that intentional discrimination in the design of
electoral structures is unconstitutional, this is hardly earth-shattering. 82
However, if Justice Kennedy means to equate a Section 2 violation with
intentional discrimination, Justice Kennedy would have severely limited the
reach and effectiveness of Section 2. 83
But consider a third alternative. Consistent with the argument advanced
in Part III, Justice Kennedy’s point may be the simple, but doctrinally radical,
idea that the State intentionally discriminates against voters (of color?) where
the State intentionally deprives them of an electoral benefit to which they
would otherwise be entitled for reasons that are not constitutionally
permissible. Importantly, the intentional discrimination that concerns Justice
Kennedy is not racial intent. That is, the Court is not making an argument
that Latinos were targeted because they were Latinos. In fact, the Court
stated, “[e]ven if we accept the District Court’s finding that the State’s action
was taken primarily for political, not racial reasons,” that does not change the
constitutional analysis. 84
The surprise here is that this is the one argument that Texas should have
been able to make. The State’s argument is that, to the extent redistricting
affected the voting power of voters in District 23, the voters they were after
were not Latinos but Democrats. Under the prior caselaw, Texas had every
reason to believe that it could get away with this distinction between race and
politics. This is simply the application of Whitcomb v. Chavis 85 and White v.
Regester. 86 Whitcomb stands for the proposition that a racial group that
aligns itself primarily with a political party is not buffeted by the vagaries of
the political process where its disadvantages are the results of politics. 87
White stands for the complementary proposition that racial groups are

81 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622.
82 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 39, at 1171.
83 See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 66.
84 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622.
85 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
86 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
87 Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 153–55.
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protected from political disadvantages where those disadvantages are visited
upon them because of (as opposed to in spite of) their race.
A Court hostile to racial representation could have applied that principle
with a vengeance. Yet, the Court refused to take that easy option. In fact, the
Court went on to strongly imply that even if it is true that the State did not
target Latinos because they are Latinos, the State may have intentionally
discriminated in a way that is constitutionally actionable because it intended
to deprive the group of an electoral opportunity. The intent that matters is the
intent to cause a particular effect: the intent to burden.
This is a significantly new development, and it has the potential of
radically transforming voting rights and antidiscrimination doctrine. The
majority created a constitutional standard of voting discrimination that
essentially mirrors the Section 2 effects standard. This development was
sufficiently worrisome to Justice Scalia that he devoted a few paragraphs
reviewing first-year constitutional law doctrine on the meaning of
discriminatory purpose. 88
What is the meaning of this development? How are we to understand this
new equal protection standard?
I think there are two ways to understand this equal protection right. One
explanation is that this equal protection right is another way of articulating
the representational rights that are thought to be protected by the
Constitution. Think of this right as similar to free speech doctrine: just as the
government regulation that burdens speech is constitutionally actionable,
government regulation that burdens an electoral right is also constitutionally
actionable. In this construction, the right is an electoral right having nothing
to do with race. Where the State burdens an electoral right, the Constitution
is implicated. 89
A different and even more radical explanation is that this equal protection
right is a redefinition of the meaning of intentional racial discrimination in
the voting rights context (and maybe even antidiscrimination law itself). This
right is different from the traditional discriminatory intent standard in that it
does not require intent to target the racial group. However, it applies only
when the voting rights of a racial group are intentionally burdened by the
State.
To concretize the point, recall here McCleskey v. Kemp, where plaintiffs
argued that Georgia’s application of the death penalty was discriminatory
because of the racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty. The
Court’s argument in McCleskey was a classic equal protection argument. The
Court argued that the plaintiff could not prevail because he could not show
88 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2667 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
89 Note that the point is not that the Constitution is violated, but that the plaintiff has

a potential claim.
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that the State implemented the death penalty because of (as opposed to in
spite of) its racially discriminatory effects upon African Americans. For his
claim to prevail, “McCleskey would have to prove that the Georgia
Legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an
anticipated racially discriminatory effect.” 90 This is a standard application of
equal protection doctrine.
Contrast McCleskey with LULAC. In LULAC, Justice Kennedy seemed
to say that even if Texas adopted its course of action because of an
anticipated political effect, the Constitution could still be violated. It is the
effect of the State’s action that matters and not its intent. If the Court is
serious about this move, it is hugely significant.
If this articulation of the racial electoral equality right seems far-fetched,
consider LULAC from the perspective of a redistricter. If you are redistricting
post-LULAC and you wish to comply with statutory and constitutional
commands, or you wish to avoid litigation, what do you do with LULAC?
Note how far the facts of LULAC are from the prototypical racial vote
discrimination case. The Act was originally conceived to address
discrimination that would be conceived as discriminatory animus against
African-Americans, in particular, that could not be regulated within the
extant constitutional framework because of structural and evidentiary
reasons. The VRA was adopted in a context in which black voters were
intentionally discriminated against by both the State and white voters. In the
classic vote dilution cases, the State would crack and pack voters of color
because it wanted to preclude them from participating in the political
process. White voters would not vote for any candidates of color not because
they disagreed with the politics of candidates of color, but because they were
colored.
LULAC bears none of the markers of the classic vote dilution cases.
Though white and Latino voters in District 23 prefer different candidates at
the polls, by voting repeatedly for Bonilla, white voters have demonstrated
their commitment to voting for a candidate of color provided that the
candidate shares their political ideology. Moreover, there is no evidence at all
of racial animus from the State. 91 There is every reason to believe that if
Latino voters were more supportive of Bonilla, Texas Republicans would
have protected their district as opposed to trying to weaken it. Moreover, by
all accounts, the State attempted to mitigate for its modification of District 23
by providing an alternative district. 92
90 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987).
91 This is not to deny that there is racial discrimination in Texas. The point here is

simply that there is absolutely no evidence of racial animus in this case.
92 As recounted by Steve Bickerstaff, the Republicans strategy on race was threefold. First, they attempted to co-opt leaders and organizations of color to join them
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If on the basis of those facts the Supreme Court not only found a
violation of Section 2 of the VRA, but also concluded that those facts
amounted to intentional discrimination, if you are redistricting, do you dare
weaken any majority-minority districts? If you would like to comply with
constitutional norms or you want to minimize the risk of litigation, you will
not take any action that can be interpreted as undermining the voting power
of voters of color. If the Court takes LULAC seriously, majority-minority
districts post-LULAC are sacrosanct.

B. Using Race to Check Politics
All the same, I agree with Professor Pildes to the extent that his argument
is that LULAC was not intended as a victory for the VRA. 93 LULAC is not
primarily about race. While the view of LULAC as a race case has merit as an
explanatory variable, it may not suffice to explain many moves in the
opinion. First, as Professor Pildes notes, LULAC would be a strong VRA case
if it had not resulted in an effective swap of District 25 for District 23. 94 As a
practical matter, Latino voters did not gain much following LULAC. Had
Justice Kennedy permitted Latino voters to hold on to District 25 as a
majority-Latino district and add District 23 as a majority-Latino district, then
LULAC could be understood as an unqualified endorsement of racial
representation. Given the Court’s holding and the result of the Court’s
holding, such a conclusion is unwarranted. Second, the explanation of
LULAC as a strong vindication of the VRA is even less persuasive in view of
the fact that Justice Kennedy chose to protect Latino voters in District 23, but
not African-American voters in District 24.
LULAC is best understood as a case that uses race to limit politics.
LULAC reflects the Court’s medium-term strategy for containing the
excesses of partisan gerrymandering. This is the best way to make sense of
the case. Justice Kennedy attacked one of the devices that the State used to
facilitate its partisan gerrymander. If you can prevent the redistricters from
moving voters of color around, you are imposing yet another additional
constraint on their ability to maximize partisan gerrymandering. 95 The
Court’s strategy is to identify effective structural constraints that limit the

against the white Democrats. BICKERSTAFF, supra note 9, at 275–76. Second, they sought
to portray their plan as being beneficial to voters of color. Id. at 264–65. Third, whenever
their partisan agenda conflicted with the interests of voters of color, partisanship trumped.
Id. at 265.
93 I think the effect of the opinion, as I have argued in this Essay, is to, at least in the
short-term, expand the reach of Section 2.
94 Pildes, supra note 66.
95 See Ortiz, supra note 70.
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discretion of the State when it is engaged in line-drawing. This is not a bad
strategy and may actually work. 96
The Court has long, and somewhat ineffectively, used its jurisprudence
on racial vote dilution to help guide its thinking about political vote
dilution. 97 Though the racial vote dilution caselaw has long provided an
incentive for litigants to frame their partisan claims in racial terms, those
cases have been almost exclusively concerned about race and not politics. 98
What is different about the Court’s move in LULAC is the attempt to check
politics by using race. Thus, the “politics not race” argument that emerged
from the tail-end of the Shaw lines of cases and upon which the district court
in LULAC relied is no longer the ironclad defense it was perceived to be.

VI. CONCLUSION
Though I think the Court’s strategy might work to limit the excesses of
politics, I worry about what the strategy will do to voting rights doctrine and
to the electoral prospects of voters of color. On doctrinal grounds, while the
strategy might be useful in the short-term, it is ultimately flawed because it
papers over important doctrinal tensions, some more evident than others, that
are created or exacerbated by the manner in which the majority in LULAC
attempts to check politics by limiting what the State can do with race. The
best evidence of this tension is the dispute between Justice Kennedy and the
Chief Justice with respect to whether compactness is an element of the
State’s defense when the State draws a Section 2 district. Other more
pressing tensions include the need to reconcile the various doctrinal
approaches among the Court’s decisions in LULAC, Thornburg v. Gingles,
Johnson v. De Grandy, Georgia v. Ashcroft, and the Shaw cases.
For example it is not clear to me that the Gingles factors are doing much
work any more. Or perhaps more accurately, the Gingles factors appear to
serve as threshold factors and do not seem determinative. Instead the totality
of circumstances approach appears to be doing most of the work. The
difficulty is that the totality of circumstances approach is more indeterminate
and seems ad hoc. Part of the problem is that as racial bloc voting decreases
and as voters of color become more dispersed, Gingles will be harder and
harder to apply. In LULAC, Gingles served as a pro forma hurdle that the

96 On the importance of constraints in the redistricting process, see Andrew Gelman
& Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 541, 542 (1994).
97 Charles, supra note 46.
98 See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV.
593, 632 (2002).
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Court easily skipped over. Thus, one remaining question is how long the
Court will continue to pay lip service to Gingles.
One must also be sensitive to the doctrinal strain between Sections 2 and
5 of the VRA as highlighted by Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion. Texas
created an off-set majority-minority district in order to comply with Section
5. It remains unclear after LULAC whether Texas could have created a
coalition or influence district, which would have enabled Texas to comply
with Section 5 but would not have been dilutive under Section 2. Georgia v.
Ashcroft allows the State to be more flexible in the design of electoral
structures when the State is complying with Section 5. But LULAC does not
seem to permit the same flexibility with respect to Section 2.
Further, it is also not clear how States should navigate between LULAC
and Shaw. Shaw comes into play when the State is too race-conscious.
LULAC comes into play when the State is not sufficiently race-conscious.
Not only should you pay attention to voters of color, but you have to make
sure that they are the right kind. Are you mixing urban dwellers with
suburban dwellers? Are you mixing recent immigrants with native-born
citizens? Are you mixing rural residents with urban residents? Are you
mixing rich with poor? LULAC calls for a heightened sense of raceconsciousness that opens up the State to liability under Shaw. This
heightened sense of race-consciousness may further racialize redistricting
disputes and lead to the type of boomerang effect that resulted in the Shaw
line of cases.
Finally, as a practical matter, it remains unclear whether voters of color
are better off under Justice Kennedy’s rules-bound and racially-instrumental
doctrinal approach than under the Chief Justice’s doctrinal olla podrida. The
Chief Justice’s approach seemed motivated by the recognition that politics
can be a dirty process; this recognition is accompanied by a reluctance to
sully the Court by deeply enmeshing it into that process. Consequently, it
seems as if Chief Justice Roberts was sympathetic to an anything-goes
approach—presumably complemented by a generous interpretation of
applicable constitutional and statutory constraints. My sense is that this
framework would not be particularly solicitous of the political needs of
voters of color, but it would also allow them to keep hard-fought raceconscious political gains. By contrast, Justice Kennedy’s approach might be
more solicitous of the needs of voters of color—by strictly enforcing a floor
below which the State may not go to deprive voters of color of
representation. But Justice Kennedy’s approach would also come with a low
ceiling that would preclude the State from being race-conscious where the
State could not justify its actions on the basis of a narrowly-construed
constitutional or statutory mandate. Thus, Professor Pildes might be right that
LULAC may eventually become an unwelcome development for those who
value the concept of racial representation.

